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PROPERTY
I.

EASEMENTS

In Briarcliffe Acres v. Briarcliffe Realty Co., Inc.1 the South
Carolina Supreme Court was asked to determine the rights of an
eleemosynary corporation with respect to the management and
control of the common areas of Briarcliffe Acres subdivision in
Myrtle Beach. In 1954, under the direction of K.C. Ellsworth,
Briarcliffe Realty Co. began to develop Briarcliffe Acres subdivision as a retirement community.2 The plats of the subdivision
showed a well-planned community with lots, streets, parks, freshwater lakes and a common beach area covering an area of approximately one square mile .

It was the plan of Ellsworth, who had effective control of
Briarcliffe Realty at the time, to create an eleemosynary corporation made up of property owners of the subdivision, and to grant
to it some degree of management and control over the common
areas of the subdivision.4 To implement this plan, several employees of the realty company established Briarcliffe Acres, an
eleemosynary corporation, on June 8, 1954. One of the purposes
of this corporation, as described in its charter, was to provide for
the management and control of the common areas of the subdivision, as indicated on existing maps and plats.' After forming a
1. 262 S.C. 599, 206 S.E.2d 886 (1974).
2. Id. at 604, 206 S.E.2d at 888.
3. Id. There were three plats of the subdivision made in 1946, 1947 and 1954. The
issue of which of these differing plats was controlling in determining the term "beach
front" was remanded.
4. Id.
5. Article Four of the Briarcliffe Acres corporate charter provided:
The purpose of this corporation or association shall be to promote and improve
the community of Briarcliffe Acres Development, to organize a social club, and
to do all things therein and thereunder to advance good neighborly feelings and
brotherhood, to promote a governing body of the community to better formulate
and carry out policies and programs of the community, and to extend help and
aid to its members in the community of Briarcliffe Acres Development.
That by virtue of the recordedmaps and plats showing the general development
plan for Briarcliffe Acres Development, showing also thereon, roads, easements,
parks, lakes, and other facilities existing and nonexisting at the present time,
togetherwith the beach-front areaas reserved, this organizationand association
has as its purpose to organize and control the use of these various and sundry
facilities to the best advantages to the community, and in connection therewith
to organize and formulate rules, regulationsand controlling uses of same.
262 S.C. at 604-5, 206 S.E.2d at 889 (emphasis added).
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corporation for the prospective property owners, the realty company took legal steps to grant certain rights of management and
control to it. The Board of Directors formulated a resolution on
July 12, 1954, authorizing the officers to make such a grant, which
took the form of a "declaration" executed and duly filed on that
same day.
This declaration specifically noted the purpose for which the
eleemosynary corporation was established and granted an interest in property to the corporation to enable it to carry out this
purpose.7 The language of the actual grant read:
6. The pertinent portion of the resolution reads:
WHEREAS, the association and corporation of Briarcliffe Acres has been organized for the purpose as set forth more particularly in Article Four (4) of its
constitution and By-laws, of which a copy of same is attached hereto and made
a part hereof; AND WHEREAS, it is necessary that Briarcliffe Realty Company, Inc., deliver to the association of Briarcliffe Acres the authorization of
management and control of parks, lakes, lots, easements, beach-front area, and
other facilities for the use of the community, existing and non-existing at the
present time;
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the President or Vice-President, and
the Secretary of this corporation be authorized and directed to sign and execute
a declaration presenting the organization of Briarcliffe Acres with the authorities, powers, control, and management as aforestated.
262 S.C. at 606, 206 S.E.2d at 889.
7. The full text of the declaration reads:
KNOW ALL YE MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That Briarcliffe Realty Company, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing and by virtue of the laws
of the state of South Carolina in consideration for property consisting of Lots
situate in the Briarcliffe Acres Development as sold and to be sold, and in
consideration for the management and control of the parks, lakes, lots, easements, beach-front area, and other facilities for the use of the community,
existing and non-existing at the present time, by the association of Briarcliffe
Acres, a corporation, and in consideration for the necessity of change of certain
restrictions flowing hereafter and contained in the deeds hereafter of Briarcliffe
Realty Company, the said Briarcliffe Realty Company, Inc., does herewith make
this declaration for the uses and purposes stated hereafter, to wit:
THAT WHEREAS, the association and corporation of Briarcliffe Acres has been
organized for the purposes as set forth more particularly in its constitution and
by-laws, of which a copy of same is attached hereto and made a part hereof,
reference being craved more particularly to Article 4, of said constitution and
by-laws, wherein, the said Briarcliffe Acres, an association and corporation is
to manage and control the parks, lakes, beaches, and other facilities for the use
of the community, existing and non-existing at the present time; and
WHEREAS, these facilites aforementioned have not heretofore been in any way
dedicated to public use or to property owners use;
NOW THEREFORE, Briarcliffe Realty Company, Inc., does hereby vest with
Briarcliffe Acres, a corporation, the rights, powers and privilege of management
and control over these properties, to wit: the lakes, parks, roads, easements,
beach-front areas and other facilities of nature and kind for the general use of
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WHEREAS, these facilities aforementioned have not heretofore
been in any way dedicated to public use or to property owners
use;
NOW THEREFORE, Briarcliffe Realty Company, Inc., does
hereby vest with Briarcliffe Acres, a corporation, the rights,
powers and privilege of management and control over these
properties, to wit: the lakes, parks, roads, easements, beachfront areas, and other facilities of nature and kind for the general use of the community and more particularly shown on recorded maps and plats of Briarcliffe Acres Development, said
management and control over said properties being in keeping
with the constitution and by-laws of the said Briarcliffe Acres,
a corporation above referred to and attached hereto.8
Several months later, in an "amending declaration," the realty
company attempted to characterize the grant as revocable but
stated that the company would allow the landowners' corporation
to retain the power of management and control so long as this
power was exercised in a manner "beneficial to the majority of
the property owners." 9 Additionally, this amending declaration
the community and more particularly shown on recorded maps and plats of

Briarcliffe Acres Development, said management and control over said properties being in keeping with the constitution and by-laws of the said Briarcliffe

Acres, a corporation above referred to and attached hereto.
BE IT FURTHER KNOWN, that henceforth Briarcliffe Realty Company deeds
shall contain along with the other usual restrictions, the restriction as follows,
to wit:
That all privileges, rights, and uses of the property of the Briarcliffe Acres
Development as controlled by the association of Briarcliffe Acres, shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said association as laid down from time to
time, and the grantee herein takes aforedescribed property, with due notice
hereof this reservation.
The afore setout restriction constitutes and is a follow through of Briarcliffe
Realty Company, Inc., in cooperation with Briarcliffe Acres, promoting and
facilitating the management and control of certain properties of the Briarcliffe
Acres Development, however, it is expressly reserved that this declaration is not
to be construed as a dedication of any of these properties, rights, or privileges
to any public use.
262 S.C. at 607-8, 206 S.E.2d at 890-1.
8. Id.
9. The full text of the "amending declaration" reads:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, That Briarcliffe Realty Company,
Inc., a corporation, duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws
of the State of South Carolina in consideration of a Declaration heretofore made
vesting certain powers of management and control in Briarcliffe Acres, an eleemosynary corporation (said Declaration being dated July 12, 1954, recorded in
the Clerk's Office for Horry County in Deed Book 142 at page 16), the said
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asserted that there had been no intent in the previous declaration
to grant a dedication or convey title to any part of the subdivision
to the corporation. In reservations of three different plats, the
realty company explicitly dedicated the use of the common areas
to the residents of the subdivision rather than the general public.' 0
From the time of these transactions in 1954, until 1964, both
the realty company and the property owners apparently operated
on the assumption that the right to management and control was
in the eleemosynary corporation. In fact, this right to participate
in the control of the common areas was used by Briarcliffe Realty
as a marketing device to attract new residents for the subdivision." In 1966, Ellsworth sold his interest and left, apparently
taking the benevolent attitude of the realty company with him.
The new management sent the following communication to the
property owners of the subdivision in May of 1967:
We ask all Residents and Property Owners to remember that
Briarcliffe Realty Co., Inc. owns title to all roads, lakes, beach
property and other quasi-public areas, and has only issued a
dedication for their proper use to the Property Owners of Briarcliffe Acres."
Briarcliffe Realty Company, Inc., does hereby make this Declaration of Intent
and purposes, to wit:

WHEREAS, under action taken at a special meeting of the Board of Directors
directing the President and Secretary of the corporation to forthwith issue this
Declaration,
NOW THEREFORE BE IT KNOWN TO ALL CONCERNED:
That the management and control as vested in Briarcliffe Acres, presently,
applies to those elements of the subdivision of Briarcliffe Acres development
consisting in general of lakes, beach-front, roads, parks, and such other facilities
as are of free use to the property owners of the Briarcliffe Acres development.
BE IT FURTHER DECLARED, that it is not to be construedhowever that this
power of management and control of such as aforestatedis an irrevocablepower,
however, BE IT KNOWN BY REASON HEREOF, that so long as reasonable
control and management arepracticed by the associationof BriarcliffeAcres in
a non-profitable manner, in accordance with the true intent and nature of a
fraternal,eleemosynary organizationand so long as such control as practiced is
beneficial to the majority of the property owners, such management and control
will be allowed to remainwith the associationof BriarcliffeAcres. Such vesting
however of management and control is not intended to be any dedication or
conveyance of any title to any such properties of Briarcliffe Realty Company,
Inc.
262 S.C. at 608-9, 206 S.E.2d at 891. (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 610-11, 206 S.E.2d at 892.
11. Id. at 613, 206 S.E.2d at 894.
12. Id. at 611, 206 S.E.2d at 892.
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Less than a year later, the new management informed the landowners that all rights to management and control of the subdivision had been revoked.' 3 This action was instituted to prevent
that revocation.
The supreme court was faced with the difficulty of determining the respective rights of the realty company and the eleemosynary corporation under the declaration and its "amendment"
which the court aptly characterized as "invitations to litigation." 4 The provisions of the declaration of July, 1954, clearly
indicated that some interest in the common areas was being conveyed but it was patently ambiguous in that it failed to clearly
define that interest. This ambiguity required the court to look
beyond the language of the document itself and consider the intent of the grantor in determining the nature of the interest.
The "amending" declaration was largely disqualified as an
indication of the type interest intended to pass by the original
declaration.' 5 This disqualification resulted from the court's interpretation of Churchv. Moody, 6 which held that "the construction placed on a deed by the grantor after its execution is immaterial in its interpretation."' 7 As the court noted, the application
of this rule was particularly suited to this case because it would
serve to prohibit the grantor from retracting part of a previous
conveyance by registering a subsequent statement to the effect
that he intended to grant a lesser interest.'" If grantors were allowed to "classify" the nature of ambiguous interests after their
creation, thereby enlarging or diminishing its extent to suit
changed circumstances, then calculated ambiguity might become
a coveted virtue in draftsmanship.
The intent of the realty company, as a corporate entity, could
only be determined through the acts of its officers and agents.' 9
The testimony of Ellsworth, as president of Briarcliffe Realty at
the time of the declaration, was accepted as indicative of the true
intent of the grantor." Ellsworth described the situation in the
subdivision to a buyer in the following fashion: "[W]e formed an
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 612, 206 S.E.2d at 893.
Id. at 614, 206 S.E.2d at 894.
98 S.C. 234, 82 S.E. 428 (1914).
262 S.C. at 614, 206 S.E.2d at 894.
Id.
Id. at 612, 206 S.E.2d at 893.
Id. at 614, 206 S.E.2d at 894.
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Eleemosynary Corporation and dedicated the ocean front, lakes,
and roads, approximately thirty-five acres of parks, to the corporation."'" The court further noted that the attorney for the realty
company had indicated in a letter that the company had dedicated rights to control of the common areas to the landowners'
corporation."2 Even the letter sent by the new management prior
to the attempted revocation claimed that the company, "issued
a dedication for their proper use to the Property Owners of Briarcliffe Acres." 3 It is important to note, however, that these statements, in fact, constitute a construction placed on a deed by the
grantor (through its officers and agents) after its execution. The
court's use of this construction in determining intent, after rejecting the "amending" declaration, seems to narrow the application
of the rule in Church v. Moody" to those situations in which the
subsequent statement of intent by the grantor would serve to
increase his interest at the expense of the grantee.
The statements of the company employees indicated a desire
on the part of Briarcliffe Realty to make a dedication of the
common area of the subdivision. A dedication of land for a particular use must, definitionally, be made to the public." The plat
provisions and part of the original declaration specifically noted
that no dedication was being made to the public. In the resultant
effort to harmonize these obviously conflicting indications of intent, the court found that an attempt had been made to create a
new interest, a dedication to private use." Since the grantor attempted to convey a non-existent type of real property interest,
the court had to consider the various qualities of the interest and
characterize it in terms of a presently existing, legally recognized
interest. They determined that, in effect, it was "nothing more
or less than an easement.

' 27

They reasoned that, during the pe-

riod that Ellsworth controlled the company, the interest had been
treated by the parties as if it had the same characteristics as an
easement. 28 Additionally, if there had been no dedication of the
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See note 12 supra.
24. See note 16 supra.
25. 262 S.C. at 615, 206 S.E.2d at 894, citing Derby Heights, Inc. v. Gantt Water &
Sewer Dist., 237 S.C. 144, 116 S.E.2d 13 (1960).
26. 262 S.C. at 616, 206 S.E.2d at 895.

27. Id.
28. Id.
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roads to the public, then the property owners' use of the roads,
in the absence of an express grant, would have to be based on an
implied easement for access. The court seemed to feel that the
express grant of the use of the roads in the declaration amounted
to the express recognition of the property owners' rights to an
implied easement.2 9 From the inclusion by the grantor, in the
same instrument, of the rights of management and control of the
other common areas, the court drew the inference that they, too,
were meant to grant express easements.3 1 Inherently, easements
are irrevocable by the grantor; therefore, the court put control of
the common areas of the subdivision back in the hands of the
31
eleemosynary corporation.
II.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

The construction of a sixty-two unit condominium apartment building was held to be violative of a scheme of restrictive
covenants barring non-residential uses of land in Hoffman v.
Cohen.32 Hoffman, the owner of two beachfront lots 33 in the Forest
Dunes Subdivision of Myrtle Beach, proposed to construct a $3
million condominium project on these lots. In addition to the
living units, the building and surrounding property were to contain a parking garage, common entrance areas and various
recreational facilities, including a swimming pool. 3 ' The Forest
Dunes subdivision was subject to restrictive covenants prohibiting subdivision of lots, extension of structures over building lines,
and use of property for non-residential purposes.3 Hoffman
29. Id.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 262 S.C. 71, 202 S.E.2d 363 (1974).

33. Each of these lots measured seventy-five by two hundred sixty feet. The small
size of these lots in relation to the size of the proposed project probably had some effect
on the decision of the court. Id. at 74, 202 S.E.2d at 364:
34. Id. at 75, 202 S.E.2d at 365.
35. The pertinent parts of the restrictive covenants are:
a. No lot shall be subdivided and no residence or building, including porches
and projections of any kind, shall be erected so as to extend beyond, over or
across any of the building lines relating to said lot.
e. This property shall be used for residential purposes only and any residence
erected on the lot herein conveyed is to cost not less than Six Thousand
($6,000.00) Dollars or to be built according to plan and specifications approved
by grantor hereof in writing by its proper officers.
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brought an action for declaratory judgment 38 to determine his
rights before he began construction of the project. The court limited itself to a consideration of whether the restrictive covenants
in the deed would prohibit the construction of this condominium.
The court found the language of the restrictive covenants to
be ambiguous as to condominium construction." Hoffman asserted that these covenants were not ambiguous in that there was
no specific prohibition of condominiums and other types of multifamily residential dwellings were allowable in the subdivision. 8
The court, however, felt that condominiums were a relatively new
type of residential construction in South Carolina and it would
be unreasonable to require that covenants drafted over thirty
years ago provide specifically for them.39 They indicated that a
condominium project's validity under a restrictive scheme might
be inherently ambiguous if, at the time the covenants were
drafted, the owners could not have foreseen the existence of condominiums" and there was more than one reasonable interpreta4
tion of the covenants. 1
To resolve the ambiguities of a scheme of restrictive covenants, the court attempted to give effect to the intention of the
parties. 2 To determine that intention, an analysis was made of
the general plan of development sought to be protected, the nature of the condominium structure and the possibility of a conflict
between the two. The nature of the condominium was found to
be more commercial than residential because its size and the
resultant congestion created many of the same problems which
made hotels and motels undesirable neighbors.4 3 Additionally,
the individual condominium units assumed a commercial nature
since they could be expected to be rented for a substantial portion
g. No lot shall be subdivided, or its boundary lines changed except with written consent of the grantor endorsed on the deed of conveyance thereof.
h. The conditions, limitations, and restrictions hereinabove made shall be
deemed covenants running with the land binding on both the grantor and grantee, their heirs, successors and assigns.
Id. at 74, 202 S.E.2d at 365.
36. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 10-2001 et seq. (1962).
37. 262 S.C. at 77, 202 S.E.2d at 366.
38. Id. at 75, 202 S.E.2d at 365.
39. Id. at 77, 202 S.E.2d at 366.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 75, 202 S.E.2d at 365, citing Nance v. Waldrop, 258 S.C. 69, 187 S.E.2d
226 (1972).
43. 262 S.C. at 76, 202 S.E.2d at 366.
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of the year." The court, consequently, held that these commercial
characteristics made construction of a condominium of this nature inconsistent with the general scheme of development, which
consisted of single-family residential structures and small apartment buildings.' 5
The dissent argued that the development of the subdivision
into single-family dwellings and small apartment buildings was
more the result of earlier city zoning laws4" than a reflection of the
intent of the covenants; hence the majority was in error to use
such development as an indication of a general plan of development fostered by the covenants. The minority also believed that
the principle of construing restrictive covenants strictly against
those seeking to enforce them47 precluded a finding that a restriction to single-family and small apartment dwellings may be implied to restrict an owner whose actions are not clearly and expressly prohibited.4 8
Ill.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

In Myers v. Cornelius,49 a lessee had an option to extend his
lease for an additional term, with the new rent to be determined
by agreement or arbitration. The lease provision which was the
source of the controversy read:
The lessees are hereby given the option of renewing this lease
for an additional ten (10) year period and the same may be
exercised by the giving of written notice to the lessors on or
before October 1, 1978, the rent for the additional ten (10) year
period shall be agreed upon by the lessors and lessees, but in the
event that they fail to agree upon said rent, then the same shall
be submitted to three arbitrators, one of whom shall be selected
by the lessors, one by the lessees and the third by the two thus
selected. The findings of these arbitrators shall be final and
binding.5 '
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Until 1970, zoning for the City of Myrtle Beach allowed only single-family residential structures in the area containing Forest Dunes. Id. at 78, 202 S.E.2d at 367.
47. The dissent cited 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 163 (1954) and Forest Land Co. v. Black, 216
S.C. 255, 57 S.E.2d 420 (1950) for this proposition.
48. 262 S.C. at 80, 202 S.E.2d at 367.
49. 262 S.C. 417, 205 S.E.2d 180 (1974).
50. Id. at 420, 205 S.E.2d at 181.
51. Id.
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The lessee was required, by other provisions of the lease, to construct considerable improvements on the land during the original

term." The question arose as to whether or not the new rental
would be determined from the value of the53 land alone or the value
of the land including the improvements.

In determining the intent of the parties in regard to this
question, the court recognized a distinction between a lease which
provided for a renewal and one which may be extended at the
option of the lessee. 5 A renewal is basically an entirely new lease,
while an option to extend is considered as a present demise with
an effective term equal to the total length of all possible extensions. 5 The language of the lease, however, was uncertain as to
whether a renewal or an option to extend was intended; as both
terms were used almost interchangeably, the court looked from
the express language to the intent of the parties to determine
which interpretation was appropriate. They found that the practical operation of the provision indicated the intention of the
parties to create an extension rather than a renewal because upon exercise of the option by the lessee,. the entire lease continues
with the only change being in the rent provision. 6 This interpretation seems to be based on the conclusion that the lessee had a
continuing leasehold interest in the land subject only to a reasonable change in rent.5"
After determining that an extension of the lease had been
intended, the court took the position that the improvements required by the lease served as consideration for the lease in addition to rental payments.18 Since the value of the improvements
was included in the total consideration contemplated by the par52. The lease provided that:
The lessees shall construct upon these premises a building or buildings of masonry construction according to plans and specifications of their choice, provided that the same is in keeping with the surrounding community and conforms to the building code of the Town of Myrtle Beach. . . . It is understood
that the lessees will maintain and operate a hotel, apartment house or motel
business upon these premises. . ..
Record at 16-17.
53. 262 S.C. at 420, 205 S.E.2d at 181.
54. Id. at 421, 205 S.E.2d at 181.
55. Id. at 421, 205 S.E.2d at 181, quoting 50 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 1156
(1970).
56. 262 S.C. at 422, 205 S.E.2d at 182.
57. Id. The provision requiring either agreement or arbitration protected the tenant
from unreasonable rent demands by the landlord on renewal.
58. 262 S.C. at 422, 205 S.E.2d at 182.
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ties at the time of the original agreement, it would be unreasonable to assume that they intended this value to additionally serve
as a basis for the computation of the rent in the event of extension. The majority adopted the reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in Murray v. Odman,59 where they said
Inasmuch as the [lessees] herein have exercised their option,
the covenant for extension operated as a present demise of the
land for the full term. . . . From this it follows that the construction of the building formed part of the consideration, not
merely for the original . . . period, but for the entire term as
extended. While this conclusion would not of itself necessarily
determine the basis upon which the amount of the rental during
the extension period was to be fixed, it lends support to the
inference that the payment of ground rent only was to continue,
but on the basis of its reasonable value at the time."
The lessor contended that a lease provision requiring that all
improvements become property of the lessor upon termination of
the lease 1 gave him title to the improvements at the end of the
original term of twenty years, thereby making their value a valid
addition to the basis value of the property for the purposes of
reaching a new rental agreement.2 The court rejected this argument by saying that, upon exercising his option to renew, the
lessee had continued the term of the original lease, rather than
created a new term.6 3 The result was that full ownership of the
improvements did not vest in the lessor until the end of the longer
term. Since the lessor did not own the improvements at the time
of the negotiations of the new rental terms, it was unreasonable
to assume that under the lease he was entitled to charge the lessee
for their value and the court so held.
The dissent felt that title to improvements vested in the
lessor immediately upon construction, rather than at the end of
the lease term.64 The adoption of this view would have rendered
the majority's distinction between renewals and options to extend
unnecessary because the importance of that distinction was in
59. 1 Wash. 2d 481, 96 P.2d 489 (1939). The case had essentially the same factual
situation and served as the basis for much of the court's decision in this case.
60. 262 S.C. at 422, 205 S.E.2d at 182.
61. See note 52 supra.
62. Id.
63. 262 S.C. at 424, 205 S.E.2d at 183.
64. Id.
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determining the effective end of the lease agreement. Their result
would be that the improvements, having become property of the
lessor, were a valid basis for the computation of rent.
IV.

BETTERMENTS ACT

Last year, in City of Myrtle Beach v. Parker,65 the South
Carolina Supreme Court found that the city of Myrtle Beach had
not abandoned a public easement for a street right-of-way which
ran through the leasehold of Grand Strand Amusement Park and
that the city still held the easement in trust for the use of the
general public. That decision was the basis for the controversy in
Grand Strand Amusement v. City of Myrtle Beach,6" where the
amusement company brought suit against the city under the
South Carolina Betterments Act 67 to recover the value of improvements it had made along the city's easement. The Betterments
Act outlines the basic structure of relief offered under the statute:
DEFENDANTS TO BE AWARDED FULL VALUE FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN CERTAIN CASES.-After final judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an

action to recover lands and tenements, if the defendant has
purchased the lands and tenements recovered in such action or
taken a lease thereof or those under whom he holds have purchased a title to such lands and tenements or taken a lease
thereof, supposing at the time of such purchase such title to be
good in fee or such lease to convey and secure the title and
interest therein expressed, such defendant shall be entitled to

recover of the plaintiff in such action the full value of all improvements made upon such land by such defendant or those
under whom he claims, in the manner provided in this chapter."6

The city demurred, claiming that improvements made to public
rights-of-way are not the proper subject for recovery under the
Act. 9 The court specifically addressed the question of whether
the city's easement constituted "lands and tenements" within
7
the usage given those words in the statute.
The statute provides that a judgment for improvements be65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

260 S.C. 475, 197 S.E.2d 290 (1973). See 26 S.C.L. REv. 320 (1974).
263 S.C. 257, 209 S.E.2d 898 (1974).
S.C. CODE ANN. § § 47-501 et seq. (1962).
d.
263 S.C. at 260-61, 209 S.E.2d at 900.
263 S.C. at 260, 209 S.E.2d at 899.
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comes a lien on the property itself' and that the property may
be sold to satisfy the judgment.7 2 Such a judgment, however, is
not against the owner of the property but rather against the property itself.73 The court reasoned that if the only method of enforcing a recovery under the statute was by judicial sale,74 then the
statute was meant to apply only to those interests in land which
would be subject to such a sale. They concluded that a public
easement for a municipal right-of-way was not subject to sale and
could not have been the proper subject of recovery under the
76
Betterments Act.
Although the Court failed to cite specific authority, its opinion is supported by Bethea v. Allen77 which held that when a new
right is created by a statute which contains a method to enforce
that right, then that method of enforcement is considered exclusive. It can be logically inferred that, if judicial sale is the exclusive remedy offered by the Betterments Act, then claims against
property not subject to that remedy are not meant to be enforced
by the Act.
71. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§ 57-405 (1962) provides:

lands and tenements so recovered shall be held to respond to such judgment for betterments
in the same manner and for the same time as if they had been attached on mesne
process and such judgment for betterments shall be a lien on such land in
preference to all other liens.
JUDGMENT EQUIVALENT TO ATTACHMENT: PRIORITY OF LIENS.-The

72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 57-406 (1962) provides:
SALE OF LANDS: DIVISION OF PROCEEDS: PAYMENT IN LIEU OF sALE.-When final

judgment shall be rendered as provided in § 57-404 the court shall direct a sale
of the land recovered in ejectment on the following terms: That out of the
proceeds of sale the plaintiff in ejectment or his legal representative be paid the
amount ascertained as the value of his land without improvements put thereon
in good faith by the defendant and the surplus, if any, be paid to the occupying
claimant or his legal representative. But this section shall not apply when the
plaintiff in ejectment or his legal representative shall, within sixty days after
the aforesaid special verdict, pay into the office of the clerk of the court, for the
defendant, the value of the betterments as so found in such special verdict.
73. 263 S.C. at 261, 209 S.E.2d at 900.
74. See note 72 supra.
75. 263 S.C. at 261, 209 S.E.2d at 900.
76. Id.
77. 101 S.C. 350, 85 S.E. 903 (1915).
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